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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 981499

- vs
STEVEN DIETER BUGYIK,

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a conviction for a third
degree felony in a criminal case.

The Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the initial stop of Appellant's car

was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion of the
commission of a crime.

The trial court's decision whether

the facts of a particular case give rise to a reasonable
suspicion is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
2.

If the initial stop was justified at its

1

inception, whether the ensuing detention was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which initially
justified the stop.

This is a question of law, and the

trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness.
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); see

State

State v. Lopez,

873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
3.

Whether the warrantless, unconsented search of

the trunk of Appellant's car was supported by probable
cause.

The determination of probable cause is a question of

law the trial court's determination of which is reviewed for
correctness.

The trial court's underlying factual findings

are examined for clear error.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932

(Utah 1994).
The foregoing issues were preserved in the trial
court in Appellant's Memorandum in support of his motion to
suppress (R 60,65,72).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature, Course and Disposition Below
Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute, in violation of U.C.A. §58-378(1)(a)(I), and with failure to pay drug stamp tax, in
violation of U.C.A. §59-19-106, both third degree felonies
(R 1 ) . After the trial court denied a Motion to Suppress (R
92), Appellant entered a conditional plea of no contest to
the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute (R 114), preserving his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress (R 121).
Statement of Facts1
Trooper Haycock stopped Bugyik's car on 1-70
around 3:00 p.m. March 6, 1997.

The weather was clear and

warm (T 39). Haycock says he stopped the car for no
registration, because when the car drove by Haycock's
stationary position he saw no license plates on it.

Bugyik

stopped and Haycock stopped behind him; Bugyik got out of
his car (T 4 ) . According to Haycock, Bugyik was wearing a
t-shirt, shorts and no shoes, and he looked "scared."
1

He

The suppression hearing transcript (R 147)is not
separately paginated. Accordingly, all citations herein to that
transcript are designated with "T" and the appropriate page in
that transcript.
3

asked Haycock why he had been stopped and Haycock told him
"for no registration/'

Bugyik told him the car was a

rental, and that there should be a rental agreement.
Haycock moved up "right by" the trunk of Bugyik's car and
saw what he "thought might be a temporary sticker pasted in
the back window." On closer examination Haycock determined
that the sticker was a valid 90-day Arizona temporary permit
(T 5) .
While Haycock was looking at the temporary
registration sticker, Bugyik explained that he had a medical
emergency in Denver and that a Dr. Dean Allen had rented the
car for him (T 24).
Trooper Haycock says that after seeing that the
temporary sticker was valid, he was "preparing just to
depart and leave," (T 5) but never told Bugyik that he had
determined that the car was properly registered (T 42-43),
nor that Bugyik was at that point free to leave (T 23-23).
The record is unclear whether Haycock, at the time he was
"preparing just to depart and leave," turned around toward
his patrol car;

Haycock conspicuously avoided affirmatively

responding to two direct questions whether he ever actually
turned around to leave (T 43).

4

Before Haycock did anything to let Bugyik know
that he was satisfied that the registration was valid,
Bugyik asked Haycock if he wanted to see the lease
agreement.

Haycock responded, "Sure, I'd like to see that,

if you don't mind"(T 6 ) .

Bugyik immediately retrieved a

Hertz envelope from the interior of the car and gave it to
Haycock (T 7 ) .
Haycock examined the rental agreement and noticed
that the renter was Dean Porter, and did not list Bugyik as
a driver.

He then asked Bugyik for a driver's license (T 8,

29), and Bugyik "started explaining about his Arizona
drivers license" in a manner characterized by Haycock as
"gibberish" (T 7 ) . Bugyik returned to the inside of the car
and retrieved an Arizona license that was punched,
indicating to Haycock that the license was not valid (T
8,30).
Haycock testified that by the time Bugyik produced
the driver's license, Bugyik's fear and confusion had
escalated, and that his behavior caused Haycock to fear for
his own safety (T 9 ) , although Haycock never performed a
Terry

pat down for weapons (T 17,36).

5

While Bugyik had been retrieving the driver's
license, the trooper noted the following (T 9 ) :
1.

An open Colorado road map on the front seat of

2.

That there were a lot of keys and

the car;

advertisements on the ignition key ring;
3.

A Day's Inn envelope in the luggage in the

back seat;
4.

A pizza box and Coke cans in the car;

5.

That the passenger window was partly rolled

6.

Bugyik was to Haycock's mind more nervous that

down;

other people in a similar situation;
7.

The rental agreement was not in Bugyik's name

and Bugyik was not named as a second driver; and
8.

A Las Vegas Line magazine, which Haycock

apparently recognized as a complimentary motel publication.
Trooper Haycock then asked Bugyik how much
marijuana was in the car (T 9, 10). Bugyik said that there
was none.

Haycock asked him what was in the trunk, and

Bugyik told him that there was nothing in the trunk, but
that Haycock could not look in it.

6

Although Haycock then

confronted him with the familiar "nothing to hide"
challenge, Bugyik still refused to permit him to search the
trunk.

During this exchange, Bugyik also said that he had

not "been in the trunk," which Haycock considered to be
inconsistent with Bugyik's statement that there was nothing
in the trunk (T 10).
After Haycock's accusation and Bugyik's denial
about marijuana, Haycock searched the interior of the car
for weapons (T 10), putting his head and shoulders inside
the car while kneeling on the driver's side seat or the
floor (T 18). He looked under the road map, under the front
seat (T 17), and into the back seat area (T 18), determining
that there were no weapons in the car.2
Trooper Haycock testified

that while he was

inside the car searching for weapons, he detected a "strong
odor of coffee," (T 10) and a "very weak odor of marijuana"
(T 11). An experienced officer in drug interdiction,
Haycock said that some people who are trying to hide
something with a strong odor use "coffee grounds" and "other
2

Haycock first said that he made this search for weapons
in the vicinity of where Bugyik was seated in the vehicle
(T 10) .
Later, Haycock said that during this weapons search, Bugyik was
"standing at the front right of the car by the door/' (T 18).
Almost immediately, Haycock changed Bugyik's location during the
weapons search to the left,
or driver's side of the car (T 19).
7

things'' for that purpose (T 11, 12) . After smelling the
coffee odor and the "weak odor of marijuana," he removed the
keys from the ignition and opened the trunk of the car,
where he found two duffle bags.

He bent over, smelled the

duffel bags, and detected a "strong odor of marijuana" (T
10).

He subsequently discovered that the duffle bags

contained nine bundles of marijuana weighing 65 pounds (T
12).

The marijuana was wrapped in sheets of fabric

softener(T 34) which Haycock said smelled like coffee, and
which was the identical odor he had detected during his
search of the interior of the car for weapons (T 44).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I: The stop of Appellant's car was not
justified at its inception by a reasonable articulable
suspicion of crime.

When he failed to see the car's

temporary registration sticker, which was valid and properly
displayed in the rear window of the car, the officer stopped
the car immediately without making any effort to dispel his
suspicion of improper registration by overtaking the car and
observing from a closer distance whether it bore a temporary
sticker.

The officer's failure to employ this less

intrusive means of investigation rendered his continued

8

suspicion an unreasonable basis for making a level two
seizure.
POINT II; If the initial stop was justified, the
ensuing detention exceeded its permissible scope.

Having

determined that Appellant's car bore a valid temporary
registration sticker which was lawfully displayed, the
officer did not so inform Appellant, and nothing in the
circumstances made it clear to Appellant that he was free to
go.

Although there existed an available means for the

officer promptly to confirm or dispel his suspicion that the
car might be stolen, the officer did not employ that means,
but instead remained and continued to gather information
relating to his suspicion that Appellant was a drug courier.
POINT III: The warrantless, unconsented search of
the trunk of Appellant's car was not supported by probable
cause.

The officer's search of the car interior was not in

fact a search for weapons and was not within the weapons
exception to the warrant requirement.

The odors which the

officer claimed to have detected while searching the car
interior cannot be considered in the probable cause
determination because the officer expressly did not consider
the odors before concluding that the trunk contained

9

marijuana, and because the evidence regarding the odors is
vague, irrelevant and unbelievable.

The remaining facts

from which the officer says he developed probable cause for
the trunk search are not an adequate basis for probable
cause to believe the trunk contained drugs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: HAYCOCK'S INITIAL STOP OF BUGYIK' S
CAR WAS NOT JUSTIFIED AT ITS INCEPTION
BECAUSE THE TROOPER DID NOT EMPLOY AN
AVAILABLE, LESS INTRUSIVE MEANS TO CONFIRM
OR DISPEL HIS SUSPICION.

Stopping a car and detaining its occupants
constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure.
440 U.S. 648 (1979).

Delaware v. Prouse,

In order to be reasonable, the initial

stop must be justified, and the officer's subsequent actions
must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying the
stop. City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165 (Utah App.
1997).

Unless the stop was initially justified, and the

subsequent inquiry limited in scope to the purpose that
justified it,

any evidence gathered during the ensuing

investigation at the scene is not admissible, regardless
whether the warrantless search producing the evidence was
otherwise lawful.

State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah

1990) .
10

It is the prosecutor's burden to justify the
warrantless search of this car, and the inquiry begins with
whether the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion
that Bugyik had committed, or was about to commit a crime.
State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996).

Trooper Haycock

said that he did not see any license plates on Bugyik's car
as the car went by his stationary position (T 4 ) . By
implication, he also did not see the temporary registration
sticker when he began pursuit of Bugyik's car, because he
said that when he pulled in behind Bugyik's car he "didn't
see it either'" (T 47).
the trooper

The trial court ruled that because

"could see no license plate nor temporary

registration sticker as he approached the vehicle from
behind, he had a reasonable suspicion" that Bugyik was
driving a car without registration (R 92). 3
In State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) a

police officer, having noticed that an oncoming car

had no license plates, turned around and overtook the car to
see if he could see a temporary sticker.

Although he could

see a paper in the lower right corner of the car's rear
window, he could not tell what the paper was because of the
3

The trial court's written ruling on the Motion to
Suppress is reproduced in the Addendum, infra p. 46.
11

slant of the window.

While he was following the car, the

driver turned off the freeway and onto an infrequently used
dirt road.

Considering this to be "possibly evasive

behavior/' the officer activated his overhead lights and
stopped the car.

This Court held that the stop was proper.

In this case, Haycock made no attempt to overtake
Bugyik's car to determine if it was properly stickered, and
Bugyik had done nothing unlawful or evasive prior to the
stop.

It is settled law

that, once a stop has been made,

police officers must diligently pursue a means of
investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly.
1994).

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah

In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that

after an otherwise justifiable stop is made, "the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in a short period of time."

Florida v. Royer, 460

U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
Although defense counsel has found no Utah case
specifically requiring that an officer diligently pursue by
the least intrusive available means a course promptly to
confirm or dispel suspicion before the stop is made, this

12

Court is urged so to hold, at least in cases involving
temporary registration stickers. Important public policy is
involved.

This is because the situation presents a very

high potential for police abuse, and because unless such a
limitation is imposed, virtually any car with a temporary
sticker might be stopped on the premise that the officer
didn't clearly see the sticker.4

Absent additional facts

contributing to suspicion (such as the evasive action taken
by the driver in Naisbitt, supra),

it is reasonable to

require that an officer, before making a level two seizure,
first attempt to overtake a vehicle in order to look from a
closer vantage point for a sticker the officer was unable to
see at a distance.

Because this encounter occurred during

daylight at a time when Bugyik was driving in a lawful
manner, it is reasonable to expect that Haycock would have
been able to see the

temporary sticker merely by driving

closer to the car without having to stop it.

4

The trooper in this case, a veteran and a teacher of drug
interdiction, patrolling a highway he believes to be a major
route of drug couriers, acknowledged that he "probably" has in
the past arrested drug couriers that he initially stopped because
he saw no license plate on a car that bore a valid temporary
registration sticker (T 46). He also is aware that other
officers in his area have made drug courier arrests in identical
circumstances.
13

POINT II: EVEN IF THE INITIAL STOP WAS
JUSTIFIED, THE ENSUING DETENTION WAS NOT
REASONABLY
RELATED
IN
SCOPE
TO
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH JUSTIFIED THE STOP IN
THE FIRST INSTANCE
After he stopped Bugyik's car, Haycock's detention
went beyond the limitation that it be reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which initially justified the stop.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
1. This incident never became a levelone voluntary encounter.
Unless Haycock's examination of the rental
agreement came about as Bugyik's voluntary act at a time
after the encounter went from a level-two seizure to a
level-one police/citizen voluntary encounter, Haycock
exceeded the permissible scope of any inquiry that may have
justified the initial stop/seizure.
Once a person is seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the seizure does not
cease simply because the police formulate
an uncommunicated intention that the
seized person may go about his or her
way. For the seizure to end, it must be

clear

to the seized

person,

either from

the words of the officer or from

clear

import

of the circumstances,

the

that

the person is at liberty to go about his
or her business. State v. Higgins, 884
P.2d 1242(Utah 1 9 9 4 ) ( c i t a t i o n
omitted)

(emphasis

added).

14

After Haycock

examined the temporary sticker in

Bugyik's rear window and found it to be valid, he never
communicated that fact to Bugyik, nor did he tell Bugyik
that he could go. The trial court made a finding that after
the officer saw the valid sticker on Bugyik's car, he "noted
that his concern had been allayed, and turned to leave" (R
93).

No evidence whatever exists in this record that

Haycock "noted that his concern had been allayed" unless
this statement by the trial court is interpreted to mean
that Haycock noted this to himself,
could not have known it.

in which event Bugyik

If, on the other hand, this

statement is the trial court's expression of a finding of
fact that Haycock communicated

to Bugyik

his satisfaction

that the car was properly registered, then the finding is
clearly erroneous.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah

1994).
In addition, the trial judge's statement that
Haycock "turned to leave" is a fact which Haycock himself
did not clearly embrace when he conspicuously avoided two
direct questions about it at the suppression hearing (T 43).
Nonetheless, whether Haycock turned toward his car or not,
nothing had taken place to make it clear to Bugyik that he

15

was free to go prior to Haycock's examination of the rental
agreement.

He had told Bugyik that he stopped him "for no

registration" (T 5 ) , and had, in Bugyik's presence, taken a
close look at the sticker in the window.
nothing

to Bugyik.

Yet

he

said

In these circumstances, it is not only

reasonable, but likely, that a person in Bugyik's position
would think that the officer's close inspection of the
sticker had led the officer to the conclusion that the
sticker was not

a proper registration5, and that the officer

was going to his car to radio the dispatcher for a
registration check, to request backup, to retrieve a
citation book or a list of stolen cars, or for some other
purpose related to continuing his investigation.

If it did

occur, Haycock's turning to leave cannot be said clearly to
communicate Bugyik's freedom to go on his way.
This case is distinguishable from State v.
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1996), where this Court
held that the trial judge's

fact finding that the defendant

5

That Bugyik in fact had so interpreted Haycock's silence,
and believed it was necessary to furnish Haycock some additional
proof that the car was not stolen, provides a significantly more
rational explanation why a person in Bugyik's precarious position
would be doing anything at all to prolong the encounter than the
trial court's suggestion that Bugyik "invited continued police
attention" because he concluded that it might be helpful to
appear "exceptionally cooperative." (R 94)
16

acted of his own free will in undertaking at the scene of
the stop to repair a defective light which gave rise to the
stop was not against the clear weight of the evidence.
Patefield,

In

the officer had initially made a valid stop for

an actual violation, and had issued a ''verbal warning" to
the defendant. Upon the incomplete record of the evidence in
that case,6 where defense counsel appears to have conceded
at the suppression hearing that the officer meant only to
issue a "verbal warning" rather than to require immediate
repair of the defective light on the spot, the trial judge
found as a fact that the defendant voluntarily undertook to
fix the light, and concluded that he thereby voluntarily
converted the stop to a level-one encounter.
Unlike the Patefield

record7, the evidence in this

case is clear that the officer said nothing to Bugyik about
his freedom to leave.

The portion of the Patefield opinion

dealing with the level-two/level-one issue
to have been more

appears, then,

a review (under a "clearly erroneous"

6

"No testimony was given to clarify whether Eldredge
returned Patefield's driver's license or told Patefield that he
was free to leave before Patefield offered to repair the light."
927 P.2d at 656.
7

" . . . the record is less than precise as to exactly what
was said during the exchange between Eldredge and Patefield . .
927 P.2d at 659.
17

standard) of the trial court's findings of fact in a case
where the evidentiary record was incomplete, unclear and
ambiguous,

than a review for correctness of the trial

court's legal conclusions.
as there was in Patefield,

Here, there is no possibility,
that the officer had returned a

drivers' license, symbolic of the termination of police
inquiry, and of the person's freedom thereafter to leave.
It was never the clear import of the circumstances in this
case that Bugyik was free to leave, nor did Haycock ever
tell him so.
Haycock acknowledged that in order for him to
effect the stop, it was not necessary for him to see the
rental agreement (T 21). Since

the encounter had not

changed from a level two seizure to a level one citizenpolice exchange in which Bugyik actually volunteered the
rental agreement, Haycock's examination of the agreement
exceeded the permissible scope of his investigation because
it was not necessary to the determination whether the car
had a valid registration sticker.
2. Even if the stop had become a level-one
encounter when Haycock saw the rental
agreement, it then returned to level-two
status, and Haycock's ensuing investigation
exceeded its permissible scope.

18

If, contrary to the foregoing analysis, the
initial stop had become a level-one consensual encounter
which was extended by Bugyik's offer to show Haycock the
rental agreement, the encounter returned to level-two status
when Haycock noticed the discrepancies between the contract
and what Bugyik had told him.

Haycock said that at this

point he considered that the car might be stolen, and that
Bugyik was not free to go (T 27).
If reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity does arise, the scope
of the stop is still limited. The
officers must diligently pursue a means
of investigation that is likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it is
necessary to detain the defendant.
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah

1994), at 1131 {citations

omitted).

Did Haycock pursue the least intrusive means
available to him quickly to confirm or dispel his suspicion
that the car was stolen?

He did not:

Q: If after you determined that the
rental agreement did not show Mr. Bugyik
as an authorized driver, is there
anything that you could have done that
would have dispelled your suspicion that
the car was stolen so that you would have
let him go on his way if nothing else had
happened?
A: Yes, sir.
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Q: What would that have been?
A: Calling Hertz on the telephone and
asking them if they had listed him in
some way.
(T 27-28)
Instead of pursuing this means, however, Haycock
remained with Bugyik, asking to see his driver's license (T
7), and making numerous, detailed observations about the
interior of the car while Bugyik was looking for the drivers
license.8

In so doing, Haycock exceeded the scope of the

inquiry into his suspicion that the car was stolen.
Although Haycock says that by the time he got a look at the
rental agreement, he had observed facts and drawn inferences
that led him to*suspect Bugyik was a drug courier, the
inference was not reasonable.

Those facts are no more

consistent with crime than with an innocent explanation,9
and they would not lead a reasonable person, even one who
possessed Haycock's expert knowledge about the use of 1-70
8

Haycock says that while Bugyik was looking for the
drivers license, he saw a Colorado road map on the passenger
seat, numerous keys and advertisements on the ignition key ring,
a Day's Inn envelope, luggage in the back seat (instead of in the
trunk), a Domino's Pizza box and Cherry Coke cans, a partially
rolled down window, and a Las Vegas Line magazine. (T 9)
9

". . . these circumstances ^describe a very large
category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject
to virtually random seizures were [we] to conclude that as little
foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.'"
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997). Citing Reid v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 438, 441 (1980).
20

and rental cars by drug couriers, to suspect that Bugyik was
carrying illegal drugs.

See

State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825

(Utah App. 1992); State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 84 (Utah App.
1987).

At this point in the encounter, therefore, Haycock's

inquiry was limited in scope to determining whether the car
was stolen, and he did not pursue a reasonable and available
means to minimize the encounter and resolve the question.

POINT III: THE WARRANTLESS, UNCONSENTED
SEARCH OF BUGYIK' S TRUNK WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY PROBABLE CAUSE
Because Haycock searched the trunk of Bugyik's
car without Bugyik's consent and without a warrant, it is
the State's burden to establish that the search was
reasonable.
aff'd,

State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App.

939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997).

1996),

The warrantless search of

an automobile requires both probable cause and exigent
circumstances.10 State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah
1996).

10

It is conceded that under the present state of the law in
Utah, "exigent circumstances'7 will exist in virtually every
highway stop, State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1996),
so Appellant does not rely on the absence of exigent
circumstances.
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1. Haycock's search of the car interior
was not within the weapons exception to
the warrant requirement.
According to Haycock's testimony at the
suppression hearing, Bugyik eventually found and gave him an
Arizona driver's license that had been punched, indicating
that it had been suspended.

Haycock says that by this time

Bugyik's apparent fear and agitation had continued to
escalate, making Haycock fear for his own safety (T 9 ) . The
trooper did not, however, immediately act on that fear by
patting Bugyik down11 or by looking for weapons inside the
car; rather, he asked
the

trunk,

Bugyik

how much marijuana

there

was

in

(T 9,10), eliciting from him a denial, a refusal

to consent to a search of the trunk, and an additional
suspicious inconsistency (T 10). It was not until after all
this that Haycock got inside the car to look, according to
him, for weapons.
Was Haycock's search of the car interior for
weapons justified?

11

Prior to the formal arrest, Haycock never did search
Bugyik's person for weapons. He testified that because Bugyik
was wearing shorts, no shoes and a very tight T-shirt, there was
not in his mind any substantial concern that Bugyik was
concealing a weapon on his person (T 21, 36).
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(T)he search of the passenger compartment
of an automobile, limited to those areas
in which a weapon may be placed or
hidden, is permissible if the police
officer possesses a reasonable belief

based on "specific

and articulable

facts

which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant" the officer in believing that
the suspect is dangerous and the suspect
may gain immediate control of weapons.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049

(1983) Citing

Terry

(1968)

(emphasis

at 21.

v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1

added)

This "weapons exception" is established in Utah.
In State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992), an
officer had made a valid speeding stop.

During the ensuing

colloquy with the driver about his license and registration,
the officer saw a rifle in the hatchback of the car.
driver said the gun was not loaded.

The

The officer noticed

that he appeared "shaky," and thought he might be under the
influence of drugs.
the gun.

The officer did not immediately check

He was in his vehicle running the driver's license

check when he saw the driver move a black bag toward himself
from the hatchback of his car.

The officer said that at

this point he became concerned for his safety, fearing that
the driver might be reaching for another weapon.

He

discontinued the license and registration checks, called for
backup, and immediately approached the car to follow up on
23

his concern.

He saw the black bag behind the driver's seat

under some garbage.

He asked the driver whether he had any

other firearms in the car and the driver said he did not.
The officer directed the driver to get out of the car and
stand on the passenger side, then searched the interior of
the car.

When he came upon the black bag he opened it,

later stating that he did so because he wanted to see if it
contained a gun.

There was no gun in the bag, but it

contained illegal drugs and paraphernalia.

The Court of

Appeals approved the search of the bag, holding that it was
within the "weapons exception'' established in Michigan v.
Long:
When an officer reasonably believes a
suspect is dangerous and may obtain
immediate control of weapons, a
protective search is justified. . . . An
officer may conduct a protective weapons
search only if "a reasonably prudent
[person] in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his [or her]
safety or that of others was in danger. .
Furthermore, the fact, taken in
isolation, that a suspect is outside a
vehicle while an officer is conducting a
search does not overcome an officer's
reasonable fear because the suspect may
"break away from police control and
retrieve a weapon from [the] automobile."

839 P.2d at 870 {citations
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omitted).

Haycock's search of the interior of Bugyik's car
cannot be justified under the weapons exception defined in

Michigan

v. Long and
1.

Bradford:

No specific facts have ever been articulated

by Haycock as warranting his belief that Bugyik was
dangerous and may have gained immediate control of weapons.
All Haycock says is that he feared for his safety because
Bugyik's apparent fear had continued to escalate as the
encounter wore on.

In contrast, the officer in Bradford

had

seen one gun in the car and had watched the driver from a
distance as he pulled the black bag towards himself while
the officer was absent running a license and registration
check.

These specific

facts in Bradford

clearly warranted a

belief that the driver might be dangerous and might be able
to gain immediate control of a weapon from inside the car or
from inside the black bag.

The present case has no such

specific facts sufficient reasonably to warrant the
requisite fear for personal safety which the cases require.
2.

Haycock's testimony that his search of the car

interior was motivated by his fear for his own safety is not
borne out by the circumstances.

Although he claims to have

developed this fear by the time Bugyik had produced the
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suspended Arizona license, Haycock did not at that time
conduct the search of the car interior.

Instead, he posed

to Bugyik the startling question: "How much marijuana is in
the trunk?"12

And when Bugyik denied any such knowledge,

Haycock still did not act on his claim of fear for personal
safety by searching the interior for weapons.

Instead, he

engaged Bugyik in a dialogue designed to secure his consent
to a search of the car's trunk, and when Bugyik refused
consent, Haycock still didn't search for weapons.

Rather,

he made a second attempt, employing the familiar "nothing to
hide" challenge, to get Bugyik's consent, which was refused
a second time.

It was then that Haycock searched the

interior of the car.

The timing of the claimed search for

weapons is highly suspect, and although Haycock's subjective
mind set is not the test, it strongly

suggests that he did

not in fact harbor the fear for personal safety which he
offers to justify his entry into the car interior.

12

If nothing else, the question demonstrates Haycock's
confidence in a conclusion he had already reached, and which is
almost certainly his primary motivation and focus from at least
that point (and probably earlier) on.
26

2. Haycock's warrantless and unconsented
search of the trunk was not supported by
probable cause.

The trial court listed the facts it believed
sufficient to establish probable cause for Haycock's search
of the trunk of the car (R 95) :13
1.

Bugyik's one piece of luggage inside the car

instead of in the trunk.
2.

Bugyik's excessive and escalating fear.

3.

Bugyik wasn't a listed driver on the contract.

4.

Bugyik gave the incorrect surname of the

5.

The open road map on the front seat.

6.

Numerous keys on the ignition keyring.

7.

Fast food wrappers inside the car.

8.

Bugyik's claim of travel from Tucson to Denver

renter.

because of a family medical emergency.
9.

The Las Vegas Line magazine and the Day's Inn

envelope, indicating that the car had been in Las Vegas.14
13

Addendum, infra

p. 46.

14

There is no evidence that Haycock knew which Day's Inn
had been the source of the envelope at any time before he
searched the trunk, so the trial court's conclusion in this
respect is clearly erroneous.
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10.

The proposition that the route Tucson-Las

Vegas-Denver "would be a very substantial detour,
particularly for one responding to a family emergency."
11.

The fact that Bugyik's clothing "could not

conceal much of a weapon."
12.

Bugyik's invalid Arizona driver's license.

13.

The fact that Bugyik was "traveling on a drug

courier route from an area that exports marijuana to an area
that imports it." 15
14.

That Haycock had smelled a "weak odor of

marijuana and a strong odor of coffee" inside the car, but
saw no coffee
15.

(R 9 6 ) .
Bugyik "had stated that he did not know what

was in the trunk"

(R 9 7 ) .

Considering first the only alleged facts that are
even remotely connected to a reasonable suspicion of drug
transport,

the odors which Haycock claims to have smelled

inside Bugyik's car cannot be considered in the probable
cause determination in this case.

There are at least four

reasons for this:
15

Haycock said that "Tucson is characterized as an export
city for marijuana as is Las Vegas," that "Denver, Colorado is an
import city for those products," and "1-70 is a corridor in which
those drugs are driven and delivered." (T 45).
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1.

Haycock was not lawfully inside the car when he

claims to have detected the odors because his search of the
interior was not a legitimate weapons search, supra

pp. 14-

18.
2.

The odors were not in fact considered by

Haycock himself in reaching his conclusion that probable
cause existed to believe there was marijuana in the trunk of
this car.

An experienced officer and instructor in drug

interdiction (T 11), Haycock was very specifically
questioned about his actual probable cause determination in
this case:
Q: At some point, I assume, before you
turned the key in that trunk and found the
bags of marijuana you had formed in your
mind what we call probable cause to believe
that there (were) some drugs in that car,
is that fair to say:
A: Yes.
Q: At what point did that happen?
A: At the time that I had asked him how
much marijuana was in the trunk, in the
car.
Q: Okay, so by the time you asked him how
much marijuana was in the car you, at least
in your mind, had probable cause to believe
that there was marijuana in the car?
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A: Yes.

(T 40-41)

Haycock had already testified that he asked Bugyik how much
marijuana was in the car before
weapons (T 10,11).

he got inside it to look for

When defense counsel attempted to elicit

from him an inconsistency, suggesting that the odors were a
part of his actual probable cause decision, Haycock did not
take the bait:
Q: Okay, so by the time you asked him how
much marijuana was in the car you, at least
in your mind, had probable cause to believe
that there was marijuana in the car?
A: Yes.
Q: And that was based on what, Trooper?
A: That was based on the points of
reasonable suspicion that I addressed in
this case.
Q: Including the smell,
luggage, all of that?

the map, the

A: The map, the keys, the Day's Inn, the
fast foods, the window rolled down on the
passenger side, the luggage, the fear, the
lease agreement, the false name, the Las
Vegas magazine.
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3. The trial court's findings relating to the
existence of these odors are clearly erroneous.

Implicit in

the trial court's finding that Haycock had smelled a strong
odor of coffee in the passenger compartment of Bugyik's car
is a finding that the smell Haycock actually perceived was
the odor to which Haycock had referred in his testimony that
couriers use the odor of coffee to conceal marijuana.16
This finding is clearly erroneous.

in this case was that "I never

Haycock's own testimony

smelled

anything

like

It/'

(T

34) 17 and it is therefore impossible that what he smelled
was the "coffee" he testified is used to conceal marijuana.
Since Haycock was smelling something for the first time, and
since there is no evidence that the odor he smelled is
something that is used by couriers to conceal drugs, the
trial court's finding is

16

"Haycock had learned that coffee odors can be used to
mask marijuana odors." (R 97)
17

This statement by Haycock is incorrectly punctuated in
the transcript as a question.
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not supported by the evidence. 18
4.

The evidence of the odor of marijuana is vague,

unreliable and inherently suspicious.
finding

The trial court's

(R 97) that there existed a "weak odor of marijuana"

is clearly erroneous.

Haycock, almost as an afterthought

when he had testified in detail about he "strong odor of
coffee" he had detected inside Bugyik's car, added that
"There was also a very
in the car."

weak

odor of marijuana, seemed

to be

(T 11) This is less than an enthusiastic

assertion of a clear fact; Haycock does not actually say
that there was a smell of marijuana inside the car, rather
that there seemed to be.

He not only says the smell was

weak, but that it was very weak.
rely on it in forming

In addition, he did not

his conclusion that there was probable

cause to believe that drugs were in the trunk, supra
18

p.20,

Nor borne out by subsequent events. When Haycock first
opened the trunk he noticed two duffel bags. When, without
moving or opening them, he " . . . bent over, smelled the duffel
bags, there was a strong odor of marijuana
in those duffel bags/'
(T 10) not the normal odor of coffee, and not the "strong odor of
coffee (T 10)" which he had smelled inside the car, which he and
the prosecutor later expanded to include "these sweet coffees'7
and "these sweet cappuccino coffees that are popular today (T
44)." Haycock identified the smell he detected inside the car as
the smell of the fabric softener sheets (" . . . they sure stunk"
[T 34])in which the marijuana had been wrapped (T 34). The fact
that he did not smell this odor when he bent over to smell the
duffel bags when he first found them in the trunk is ample reason
to question his entire testimony about what he smelled in the
car.
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nor did he ever say that it strengthened the conclusion he
had already reached before he smelled anything.
It is conceded that the smell of marijuana may
itself provide probable cause to justify a warrantless
search of an automobile, State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969
(Utah App. 1992).

According to the trial court, "Even the

weak smell of marijuana, standing alone, is sufficient to
justify a search" (R 97; Addendum, infra),

but no Utah case

was found in which the weak smell of marijuana was held,
absent any other fact, to provide probable cause for a
warrantless and unconsented search.

Whether or not such a

"weak plain smell" exception exists in Utah, the trial court
in this case extends the doctrine to include a "very weak
seemed

plain smell" that the officer was only willing to say
to be inside the car.

Upon Haycock's testimony about what

he smelled in the car, the very existence of a marijuana
smell is seriously in question and at best tenuous.

It

should not be held adequate to establish probable cause to
search the trunk in this case.
Of the remaining facts the trial court listed as
establishing probable cause for this search, some make no
sense at all.

In this category are the trial court's #6
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(numerous keys on the ignition key ring), #11 (the fact that
Bugyik's clothing could not conceal much of a weapon) and
#12 (the invalid driver's license).

None of these facts

have any logical bearing on drug transport in general nor on
the question whether there was reason to believe that
Bugyik's trunk contained marijuana.
The trial court's #7 (fast food wrappers inside the
car) is also useless and irrelevant to the inquiry.

Even if

there had been testimony (which there was not) that
Haycock's experience has shown him that drug couriers have
fast food wrappers inside their cars, that fact is no more
useful than the fact, for example, that drug couriers often
drink milk.

In fact, in the context of this case, the fast

food wrappers tend to corroborate Bugyik's story that he was
in a hurry to get to Denver.
Similarly, Item #5 (the open road map) has no
conceivable connection to the transport of drugs.

Even

though Haycock said that he often sees road maps in cars
driven by drug couriers (T 17), that fact is not probative
of the likelihood that someone with a map is a drug courier.
Haycock's second conclusion about the map, viz.,

that if

Bugyik really did have family in Denver he would not need a
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map because he would know the way (T 17), is selective
speculation in its pristine form.

There exist myriad

reasons for following a map, none involving crime.

That

Haycock may actually believe that the use of a road map
increases (to any degree whatever) the likelihood of drug
transport, and that he may act upon this and similarly
innocuous facts which he, in his zealous effort to intercept
drugs, quite incorrectly regards as reliable earmarks of
drug traffic,

to effect significant intrusions upon

personal liberty, is ample reason for this Court to require
more of him.19
The facts listed #8 (Bugyik's claim of travel from
Tucson to Denver because of a family emergency), #9 (Las
Vegas Line Magazine and Day's Inn envelope) and #10 (the
"detour" theory) are all related to Haycock's reasoning that
Bugyik had taken a route of travel that went through Las
Vegas and that, by implication,

this route would not be

chosen by anyone who was really responding to a family
emergency in Denver.

This speculation by Haycock requires

19

"The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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also a completely unfounded assumption that if Bugyik's
announced purpose were legitimate, he would (1) Know about
the alternate route which Haycock appears to believe would
inevitably be chosen by everyone going from Tucson to Denver
to respond to a family emergency, (2) Choose Haycock's route
despite that it involves travel on narrower roads which may
be more difficult, dangerous, or tiring, and (3) have no
legitimate interest or purpose, whether related to the
family emergency or some ancillary reason, in taking a
longer route.

Even though the route Tucson-Las Vegas-Denver

is longer than that which Haycock posits, there are again
any number of innocent explanations20 why the longer route
would be used by someone who really did have a family
emergency in Denver.21
The two facts listed by the trial court regarding
the rental contract, #3 (Bugyik was not a listed driver) and
#4 (Bugyik gave the incorrect surname of the renter) are
admittedly a basis for suspicion that the car he was driving

20

State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997).

21

"The fact that defendants were nervous does not raise a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity {citing
State
v.
Robinson,
797 P.2d 435.436),
nor does the fact that they were
proceeding in a less than direct route to their destination."
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992).
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may have

been

stolen,

although even Haycock backed away from

his statement that if the driver isn't authorized by the
contract, ''It's a stolen car" (T 26). These facts, however,
are wholly without significance as regards the transport
illegal

drugs

of

except insofar as they indicate the precise

opposite of what Haycock and the trial court appear to
believe.

A forceful argument can be made for the

proposition that somebody who is actually transporting a
large quantity of illegal drugs along a major drug
"corridor" in a vehicle of a type (rented) used by a
disproportionately

large segment of drug couriers22 will be

very unlikely to be doing so in

a stolen

car.

Although one

may exist, counsel is aware of no case in which the orderly,
planned interstate transport of a large quantity of illegal
drugs over major Interstate highways known to be drug
corridors was attempted during broad daylight in a stolen
car with no license plates and no valid temporary
registration sticker, or with a valid sticker that was

22

This may have been what Haycock had in mind when he
talked about the use by drug couriers of rental cars, but he
never said it. It was the prosecutor's burden to justify this
warrantless and unconsented search of Bugyik's trunk, State v.
Wells, supra.
Even if the disproportion exists it was never
made a part of the evidentiary record in this case.
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nevertheless so placed on the car as to invite the claim by
patrol officers that it was it possible to verify the
sticker only by stopping the car for a closer look.
Although Haycock mentioned several times (T 9, 14,
41) that Bugyik's car had a piece of luggage in the back
seat instead of the trunk, and although the trial court
listed that fact (#1) (R 94) as a component of the
conclusion that probable cause existed, it is not
immediately apparent why this fact raises suspicion of
criminal conduct, nor how it increased the likelihood that
this car contained illegal drugs.

Absent some specific

rationale to the contrary, the presence of the luggage in
the back seat is arguably consistent with Bugyik's story
that he was hurrying to Denver because of a family
emergency, since it is quite plausible that in his haste to
depart, Bugyik would not have taken the time to open the
trunk and place the luggage inside.
As to the fact listed #5 (Bugyik's travel along a
drug corridor in a direction consistent with transport),
Haycock acknowledged (T 45) that when he makes a stop on
1-70 he always has in mind the fact that it is a drug
corridor.

As such, there is nothing unusually suspicious
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about Bugyik's presence on that highway.23
Bugyik's inconsistent statements denying that there
was marijuana in the trunk and that he had "been in" the
trunk (#5 on the trial court's list), together with his
palpable, escalating fear (#2), are all that remains to
establish probable cause for this search.

While the

inconsistent statement about the contents of the trunk may
have some relevance to the existence of probable cause to
believe the trunk contained illegal drugs, and while
Bugyik's increasing fear and anxiety may also have some
relevance to that inquiry, they are simply not enough to
justify the search of the trunk of the car:
1.

Haycock made repeated references to Bugyik's

fear (T 5: looked
nervousness
and having
donft

behave

started
a hard
this

scared),

(T 8: more nervous,

to increase,
time

controlling

way on traffic

23

stuttering
himself)
stops,

fear

and

and

stammering

(T 9:

more scared,

people
more

" . . . a very large category of presumably innocent
travelers . . . would be subject to virtually random searches
were [we] to conclude that as little foundation as there was in
this case could justify a seizure. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438, 441 (1980); see also State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1160
(Utah App. 1997) (An innocent explanation may easily be given
for each of the four factors relied upon by the trial court.);
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997) (any number
of possible innocent explanations for defendant's behavior).
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nervous

than other people

16: more frightened

that people

are) (T 21: he was scared)

increasing
fear,

nervousness

he was afraid)
2.

In a similar

in that situation

(T 22: scared,

during

type situation),

afraid)

the entire

(T 41: the

(T

usually
(T 31:

encounter)

(T 39:

fear).

Even though Haycock was thus acutely aware that

Bugyik was more or less terrified, Haycock viewed Bugyik's
fear not so much an indication that crime was afoot, but
rather as a threat to Haycock's personal safety.

In fact,

when Haycock was literally invited to relate Bugyik's fear
to an articulable suspicion that Bugyik was concealing the
commission of a crime (possession of a stolen car or the
transport of illegal drugs would both be logical candidates
in the circumstances), Haycock instead related it to
concerns for his own safety:
Q: (DEFENSE COUNSEL)So, but what did you
suspect based on that fear?
A: To be careful, watch my step.
Q: . . . what would you tell us that you
assumed or you were suspicious was
going on?
A: . . . when I've dealt with people that
wanted to hurt me, one of the first
things that I observed about that person
is that they were afraid of me, that they
were . . . more scared than other people
40

in a similar traffic stop situation.
Q: So . . . this man's fear caused you to be
suspicious that he was going to hurt you?
A: That he could, that I needed to be careful.
Q: And you didn't have any other ideas in
your head at that point about some other
unlawful activities, you were just afraid
for your safety?
A: That's correct.
3.

The fear or nervousness of people stopped by

the police is noted in the majority of reported decisions,
and is almost universally cited by the police officers as a
component of their suspicion of crime and, in the applicable
case, of probable cause to conduct warrantless unconsented
searches.24

Fear or nervousness alone is never enough to

give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
nor to establish probable cause for a warrantless search,
State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993), but may be
24

e.g.,
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989);
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. Spotts,
861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952
(Utah App. 1993); State v. Lee, 862 P.2d 49 (Utah App.
1992); State v, Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992);
State v. Lovegren. 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1992); State v. GodinaLuna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Munsen, 621
P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431
(Utah App. 1990); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.
1988); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988); State
v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1987).
41

considered along with other objective facts that are clear
indicators of criminal activity.

While the great majority

of cases may fairly be said to discount entirely the impact
of a defendant's nervous or fearful behavior, there is
authority for the proposition that it might be probative of
reasonable suspicion (and therefore, by implication, of
probable cause) in cases where other unequivocally damning
facts were known to the officers prior to the seizure.25
There is in this case, however, no such other fact
that clearly points to criminal activity, nor to the
presence of contraband, and Bugyik's fear and nervousness is
consistent with the common reaction of even innocent persons
who are stopped by the police.26

25

See, e.g.,
State v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah App.
1993)(defendant's smoking, although consistent with an
innocent activity, was also strongly indicative of criminal
activity when witnessed by an officer whose experience
indicated to her that the defendant was smoking a marijuana
joint).
26

See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989)and
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), both discussing
the normal anxiety or nervousness that a stop by the police
almost universally produces.
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CONCLUSION
This case is a striking example of the zeal of law
enforcement where drugs and automobiles are involved.

The

conclusion is nearly inescapable that Trooper Haycock,
despite his denial (T 16), was acting on a hunch almost from
the outset of the encounter with Bugyik.

Haycock

acknowledged that he had concluded that Bugyik was a drug
courier before he ever got into the car, where he claims to
have smelled marijuana.

His testimony at the suppression

hearing demonstrates his extraordinary selectiveness in his
interpretation of otherwise innocent facts, a belief on his
part that if he encounters any fact which he has previously
seen in a drug case, he thereby has greater reason to
suspect the transport of illegal drugs (T 45), and a belief
that, in a particular case, a large number of otherwise
innocent facts which he has observed in the past in drug
transport cases, will operate synergistically to justify
seizure and detention.

The officer in this case was led to

the drugs in Bugyik's trunk by his instinct, zeal and luck
rather than by the specific, articulable facts pointing to
criminal activity that the law requires.

The trial court's

denial of Bugyik's motion to suppress should be reversed.
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ADDENDUM

TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED

NOV 2 6 1997

THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH

THE STATE OP UTAH,
RULING ON MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs

Case No. 9717-44
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

STEVEN DIETER BUGYIK,
Defendant.

The suppression hearing in this case was held on
September 30, 1997•

Following the hearing, counsel offered to

submit memoranda on the legal issues.

Counsel thereafter agreed

to supplement the record by including the fabric softener sheets
about which Trooper Richard Haycock ("Haycock") testified. The
Court has now received memoranda from both parties.
Initial Stop
Defendant contends that Haycock should not have stopped
defendant7s vehicle.

Haycock's uncontradicted testimony

established that the temporary permit sticker in the rear window
of defendant's vehicle was not visible.

Since Haycock could see

no license plate or temporary registration sticker as he
approached the vehicle from behind, he had a reasonable suspicion
that defendant was driving a vehicle without registration. The
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Court is convinced that the combination of tint, slant and
defroster element lines in the rear window made the sticker
invisible to Haycock.
Since an officer is permitted to stop any vehicle when
he observes a violation of the traffic laws, Haycock's decision
to stop defendant's vehicle did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. The Court believes that Haycock was close enough
to the rear of the vehicle to observe the great majority of
temporary stickers. The invisibility of this sticker resulted
entirely from defendant's choices.

The Court rejects defendant's

suggestion that officers must be required to drive alongside
every vehicle without license plates or a visible temporary
sticker before effecting a traffic stop.
Citizen-Police Encounter
Once Haycock got out of his car and approached
defendant on foot, he noticed the valid temporary sticker in the
rear window of defendant's vehicle.

He then did precisely what

the law requires; he notified defendant of the reason for the
stop, noted that his concern had been allayed, and turned to
leave.

At this point, the level two encounter ended.
Defendant then invited Haycock to examine his rental

agreement.

The encounter then became a level one citizen-police

encounter, just as if Haycock had walked up to defendant on the

2
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street or knocked on his door.

The facts of this case are

indistinguishable from State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App.
1992).

While it

may appear inconceivable in hindsight that

defendant invited continued police attention, Castner is evidence
that such events do occur.

Defendant may have concluded that he

was more likely to allay any police suspicion by appearing
exceptionally cooperative.
Weapons Search
The Court agrees with defendant that, by the time
Haycock searched the passenger compartment for weapons, the
encounter had risen again to a level two encounter.

If it were

still a level one encounter and Haycock suspected he was in
danger, his only remedy would be to remove himself from the
situation.

The Court must accordingly determine whether, at the

time Haycock searched the passenger compartment, he had
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
By the time Haycock searched the passenger compartment
for weapons, he had observed the following:
1.

Defendant's luggage was in the passenger

compartment, not the trunk.
2.

Defendant was more anxious than the average

citizen, and his anxiety appeared to increase, rather than
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decrease, with the passage of time.

He was unable to focus on

putting on his shoes long enough to get both of them on.
3.

Defendant was not an authorized driver of the

vehicle, which had been rented by Dean Porter.
4.

Defendant claimed that the vehicle had been rented

for him by Dr. Dean Allen.
5.

Defendant had an open road map on the front seat.

6.

The key ring had more keys than would be expected

with a normal rental car.
7.

Fast food wrappers littered the interior of the

8.

Defendant claimed to be travelling from Tucson to

vehicle.

Denver on a family medical emergency.
9.

A magazine and a motel envelope suggested that the

vehicle had been in Las Vegas.
10.

Travelling from Tucson to Denver by way of Las

Vegas would be a very substantial detour, particularly for one
responding to a family medical emergency.
11.

Defendant's clothing could not conceal much of a

12.

Defendant's Arizona license was not valid.

13.

Defendant was travelling on a drug courier route

weapon.

from an area that exports marijuana to an area that imports it.
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Some of the indicators noted by Haycock are clearly
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion and carry little
weight even when considered with other factors.

For example, an

open road map is not uncommon for interstate travellers, nor is
an untidy vehicle interior.

However, all of the factors taken

together reasonably justify a suspicion that 1) defendant may not
have authorization to possess or drive the vehicle, and 2)
defendant was not doing what he claimed to be doing.

Defendant

was also apparently driving without a valid license.

Haycock was

justified in determining that this situation warranted further
inquiry.

Defendant's agitated state and apparent deceptiveness,

coupled with the remote location and the lack of immediate backup, created a reasonable concern for officer safety.

Haycock was

therefore entitled to make a protective sweep of the passenger
compartment before proceeding with the inquiry.
Search of the Trunk
Haycock's subsequent search of the trunk of defendant's
vehicle must be justified by probable cause.

In addition to the

factors set forth in the foregoing section, Haycock-knew the
following by the time he decided to search the trunk:
1.

He smelled a weak odor of marijuana and a strong

odor of coffee in the passenger compartment, but saw no coffee.
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Haycock had learned that coffee odors can by used to mask
marijuana odors.1
2.

Defendant had stated that he did not know what was

in the trunk.
Even the weak smell of marijuana, standing alone, is
sufficient to justify a search.

Exigent circumstances are

evident from the lack of backup, the remote location, and the
time required to obtain a warrant.

The search of the trunk was

accordingly proper.
Conclusion
The motion to suppress is denied.

Defendant is ordered

to appear before the Court with his counsel on December 17, 1997,
at 9:30 a.m. for trial setting.
DATED this 26th day of November, 1997.

1

The Court has accepted defendant's invitation to smell the fabric softener sheets that
surrounded the marijuana to see if they smell like coffee. This judge has had little
experience with fabric softener, and less with coffee. The judge also has a poorly trained
olfactory sense, the performance of which is currently diminished by the viruses of the
season. The experience was not helpful to the Court's analysis.
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